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Appel: Attorney Disbarment Proceedings and the Standard of Proof

NOTE
ATTORNEY DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AND
THE STANDARD OF PROOF
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 22, 1994, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that the conduct of one Theodore Friedman warranted
disbarment.' Originally, a Special Referee recommended that Mr.
Friedman be suspended from the practice of law for a two year period.2
However, the recommended suspension was rejected by the Appellate
Division and disbarment was imposed as "the only proper punishment."'
Mr. Friedman argued, to no avail, that the application of the "fair
preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in attorney disciplinary
proceedings violated his due process rights under the United States
Constitution.4 His appeal to New York's highest court was dismissed on
May 5, 1994,' and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court on October 3, 1994.6
In In re Friedman,the Appellate Division stated that the New York
courts have "conclusively determined that the standard of proof in
attorney disciplinary proceedings is a fair preponderance of the evidence."7 Indeed, in In re Capoccia,8 the New York Court of Appeals

I. In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 635 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994). Theodore Friedman was admitted to the practice of law on April
1, 1957, and had been practicing law for over 35 years when this decision was rendered. Id. at 578.
2. Id. at 585. Mr. Friedman allegedly committed 23 separate counts of professional
misconduct arising out of his representation of personal injury claimants in three separate cases. Id.
at 578.
3. Id. at 587. In a per curiam decision, the court stated that "[ifn view of these serious acts
of misconduct which had the effect of perverting the administration of justice, we reject the
recommended suspension of respondent and find that disbarment of the respondent is the only proper
punishment." Id.
4. Id. at 586. Mr. Friedman also argued that the standard of proof violated his due process
rights under the New York State Constitution. Id. This Note will focus upon Mr. Friedman's due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
5. In re Friedman, 635 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994).
6. Friedman v. Departmental Disciplinary Commn., 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994).
7. Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
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explicitly ruled that the preponderance standard, and not the higher
standard of "clear and convincing evidence," should be applied for the
determination of professional misconduct in an attorney's disciplinary
proceeding, including disbarment.9
This Note proposes that New York should adopt the higher "clear
and convincing evidence" standard in its disbarment proceedings. Part II
reviews the three different standards of proof. Part I provides an
overview of disbarment proceedings in New York. Part IV argues that
disbarment represents an infringement of an attorney's liberty interest by
destroying the attorney's reputation and professional life. Because of the
severe nature of disbarment, such disciplinary action mandates a higher
standard of proof, notwithstanding the New York courts repeated
holdings to the contrary.' Ultimately, this Note will assert that the
lower standard is a denial of the attorney's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
II.

THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" STANDARD

Justice Harlan wrote that "a standard of proof represents an attempt
to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication."" As a practical matter, three levels of
proof have evolved for determining how strongly the fact finder must be
convinced that a given act actually occurred. 2 The lowest level is the
fair "preponderance of evidence" standard, typically applied in civil
cases, wherein the pecuniary interests of private parties are commonly in
dispute. 3 Here, the litigants share a roughly equal risk of error,
reflecting society's minimal concern with the outcome of such suits."
Thus, the finder of fact must be persuaded merely that it is more likely

8. 453 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1983).
9. Id. at 498. Capoccia concerned an attorney who was not disbarred, but suspended for a
period of six months. Id.
10. See, e.g., Capoccia, 453 N.E.2d at 497; In re Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743 (N.Y. 1976).
11. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority in Winship
held that juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard when accused of violating the criminal law. Id. at 368. Justice Harlan's concurrence has
often been cited by courts for its exploration of the standards of proof and their function. See, e.g.,
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,423 (1979); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
12. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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than not
that a given transgression has occurred before finding against a
5
party.
In contrast, the application of the highest of the three standards,
proof of guilt of an accused "beyond a reasonable doubt," is required in
a criminal case.'6 Based upon the magnitude of the defendant's interests
in such a proceeding, the criminal defendant's rights are protected by a
standard designed to minimize the likelihood of an erroneous decision."7
Indeed, the standard mandates a verdict of not guilty where the evidence
of guilt, though more compelling than the evidence of innocence, is not
overwhelming."8 It represents "a fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free."' 9 Thus, the risk of error in the administration of criminal
justice is placed predominantly upon society.2"
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas, explored the
function of the intermediate standard:
The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words "clear," ".cogent," "unequivocal" and "convincing,"
is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is no stranger to the civil law."
One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations
of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.
The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial
than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the
risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by
increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Similarly, this Court has used
the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof to protect
particularly important individual interests in various civil ases.21
The Court further stated that, in cases involving individual rights, "' [t]he
standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on
individual liberty. '

15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

16. Id. at 372.
17. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24.
18. Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasionin
CriminalCases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1306 (1977).
19. Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24.
21. Id. at 424 (citations omitted). The intermediate standard has often been expressed in terms
other than "clear and convincing," such as "clear, unequivocal and convincing," or "convincing and

to a reasonable certainty." Practically, these variations in terminology do not represent differing
levels of proof but simply differing modes of expression. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
22. Id. at 425 (alterations in original) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th
Cir. 1971)). The specific liberty interest inherent in disbarment proceedings is explored in Part IV.A.
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Civil cases involving allegations of fraud or moral turpitude, as well
as those where the consequences to the losing party are severe, typically
require the "clear and convincing" standard.23 The U.S. Supreme Court
has applied this stricter standard to deportation, denaturalization, and
expatriation cases.24 The standard has even been quantified, with
probabilities of between seventy and eighty percent being representative
of the minimum level of persuasion required of the standard.25
The New York courts have adopted and further refined the U.S.
Supreme Court's application of the intermediate standard, describing the
evidentiary requirement as a strong caution to the fact finder, forbidding
relief when the evidence is 'loose, equivocal, or contradictory.' 26 The
New York Court of Appeals has held that the main considerations, in
deciding whether the higher standard is required, include the nature of
the interest threatened and a fair allocation of the risk of erroneous
judgment between the state and the adverse party. 27 New York has
adopted a balancing test to determine when the "preponderance of
evidence" standard is appropriate. 28 The courts have articulated that it
should be rejected for a higher standard when the possible injury to the

adverse party is significantly greater than any possible harm suffered by
the state.29 Invariably, to establish serious charges, more evidence is
required than to establish minor or inconsequential ones.3"
Naturally, New York courts have looked to other in-state proceedings in ruling that a particular area of law requires the intermediate
23. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (applying the "clear and convincing"
standard in the deportation context); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (applying the
"clear and convincing" standard in the denaturalization context). See generally JACK B. WEINsEIN
ET AL., EVIDENCE 1158 (8th ed. 1988).
25. wErNsTErN ET AL., supra note 24, at 1158. The representative probabilities of the
preponderance of evidence standard and the evidence standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" are
50+% and 95+%, respectively. Id. at 1157-59.
26. George Backer Mgmt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (N.Y. 1978)
(quoting Southard v. Curley, 31 N.E. 330, 331 (N.Y. 1892)) (holding that to overcome the heavy
presumption that a written lease manifested the true intention of the parties, evidence of a very high
order was required).
27. In re Seiffert, 480 N.E.2d 734, 734-36 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that proof in a judicial
disciplinary hearing must be by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing
evidence).
28. Id. at 736.
29. Id.
30. Hutt v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (App. Div. 1983) (holding
that clear and convincing evidence must be established by an insurer contending that a fire was the
result of arson).
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standard.3 ' Further, New York courts have looked to the doctrines of
other states in determining the application of the "clear and convincing"
standard. For example, in determining that an insurer, contending that a
fire was the result of arson, must prove the affirmative defense by "clear
and convincing" evidence, a court noted the division of out of state
authorities on the matter.32 Thus, a broad range of factors contributes
to the New York courts' final conclusion as to whether the "clear and
convincing" standard is mandated.

Im. DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK
A lawyer who violates any standard of ethical or professional
conduct of the jurisdiction in which he is licensed to practice is subject
to the disciplinary rules of that jurisdiction.33 Conduct that constitutes
a breach of the ethical and professional standards of an attorney generally
includes: (1) committing a criminal act which adversely reflects on an
attorney's trustworthiness or fitness to practice; (2) engaging in activities
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (3) engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; (4) representing an
ability to improperly influence a governmental official; and (5) knowingly assisting a judge or other judicial officer in conduct that violates the
applicable rules of law.34 The New York Code, derived from a version
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, but containing
amendments drawn form the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
contains rules proscribing all of the foregoing conduct.3"
New York is the only jurisdiction in the United States that does not
place authority to discipline its attorney's with its highest court, instead
charging the responsibility to the four Appellate Divisions. 36 Each
division has consequently enacted rules creating Grievance Committees,
or Departmental Disciplinary Committees, which investigate and, where

31. See, e.g., In re Pablo C., 439 N.Y.S.2d 229, 234 (Farn. Ct. 1980) (noting the use of the
higher standard of proof by New York courts in other areas of law, specifically, in a case concerning
a natural mother's right to visit her children).
32. Hutt, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1983); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-4 (1980).

34. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8A (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1980).
35.

STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND

STANDARDS 849 (1995).
36. Gary L. Casella, The Esoteric World of Attorney Discipline, 16 WESTCHESTER BJ.,
Summer 1989, at 177.
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appropriate, prosecute complaints of professional misconduct.37
Although specific procedures vary somewhat among the four
divisions, generally, after a complaint is filed with the Grievance
Committee and a subsequent investigation is conducted, the Committee
may decide that a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted and a
Special Referee appointed.3" The Special Referee conducts the disciplinary proceeding, which consists of a non-jury trial in which the rules of
evidence are followed.39 Following the proceeding, the Special Referee
submits a report to the Appellate Division, which bases its decision on
the report's conclusions.4"
In reaching a decision, the Special Referee applies the "fair
preponderance of evidence" standard.4" However, New York case law
has not always been uniform in this regard. In 1916, the Third Department held that, in an attorney disbarment proceeding, evidence sustaining
charges of misconduct should be clear and convincing.4 2 However, in
1923, the Third Department confirmed without opinion a Special
Referee's report recommending an attorney's disbarment based on a
"preponderance of evidence. 43 Following this decision, the New York
courts have consistently determined that the lower standard should be
applied.44
The New York courts have justified denial of the intermediate
standard by holding that it is only required in cases involving the denial
of personal or liberty rights.45 Thus, the Capoccia court held that
46
attorney disciplinary proceedings do not represent such an interest.
The court, conceding that the privilege to practice law was not an
insignificant one, nonetheless held that it was more akin to a property
interest, and consequently concluded that a higher standard of proof was
not required.41

37. Id.
38. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 603.4(d), 691.4(e) (1986). The
preceding sections apply to the First and Second Divisions, respectively. Similar sections apply to
the Third and Fourth Divisions.
39. See Casella, supra note 36, at 177.

40. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 603A(e)(2), 691.4(k)(2) (1986).
41.
42.
43.
L. REV.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
In re An Attorney, 161 N.Y.S. 504 (App. Div. 1916).
Zevie B. Schizer, The Brooklyn JudicialInquiry: A Record ofAccomplishment, 29 BROOK.
27, 39 (1963).
See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
In re Capoccia, 453 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 499.
Id.
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Accordingly, New York demands only a showing of a preponderance of evidence in stripping an attorney of his profession, livelihood,
and reputation. The state insists that the protection of society and the
public interest far outweigh the disbarred attorney's own interest. 48 New
York categorizes such interest as a mere property right rather than an
interest comprising personal or liberty rights. 49 The New York courts
have consistently asserted that there are no compelling arguments that
might cause the standard to be altered. 0
Yet in so ruling, the New York courts have ignored the practical
realities that are represented by the imposition of such a severe sanction
as disbarment."' Further, New York has been inconsistent in applying
the standard in other areas of the law, under the very parameters it has
so clearly outlined. It is out of step with the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States, both at the state and federal level.5 2 Ultimately,
despite the rulings of New York's highest court, the denial of the "clear
and convincing" evidence standard constitutes nothing less than a denial
of the disciplined attorney's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Significance of the Sanction

Disbarment, the ultimate disciplinary sanction that can be levied
upon an attorney, brings with it profoundly severe repercussions. The
Seventh Circuit described the fallout quite accurately in In re Fisher:
The disbarment of an attorney is the destruction of his professional life, his character, and his livelihood. The court should, therefore,
disbar in moderation .... A removal of an attorney from practice for
a period of years entails the complete loss of a clientele with its
consequent uphill road of patient waiting to again re-establish himself
in the eyes of the public, in the good graces of the courts and his

48. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745 (N.Y. 1976).
49. Capoccia, 453 N.E.2d at 499.
50. See, e.g., Capoccia, 453 N.E.2d at 498-99; In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578, 586 (App.
Div.), appeal dismissed, 635 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994).
51. See infra part IV.A.
52. See infra part IV.B.
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fellow lawyers. In the meantime, his income and livelihood have ceased
53
to exist.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the personal interest in
reputation is included within the constitutional protection of liberty
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Subsequently, the Court
narrowed this definition, stating that reputation alone was not a
constitutionally protected interest.5 However, the Court maintained that
damage to reputation involving "more tangible interests such as
employment" would still fall under its definition of liberty.56 Consequently, deprivation of the kind that occurs in an attorney's disbarment,
and the accompanying "stigmatization," are infringements upon liberty
57 The application of the higher standard is therefore appropriinterests.
58
ate.
Moreover, New York has often applied the "clear and convincing"
standard in situations in which the interest at stake is clearly one
pertaining to property. Indeed, adverse possession must be established by
the more demanding standard.59 So too with contract reformation' and
the forfeiture of alimony payments. 6' The mere fact that property
interests were at issue did not preclude the application of the intermediate
standard in any of the foregoing instances.
However, New York steadfastly asserts that, because the risk of
harm to the individual does not outweigh the possibility of harm to
society, the greater burden of proof should not be afforded. New York
courts have reasoned that the severe repercussions incident to disbarment
"'cannot deter the Court from its duty to strike from its rolls one who
has engaged in"' misconduct, as the court must "'protect itself,
and... society, as an instrument of justice."' 62
Concededly, a state has legitimate interests in assuring that its bar

53. In re Fisher 179 F.2d 361, 370 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825
(1950).
54. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).

55. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-06 (1976).
56. Id. at 701.
57. Elizabeth Mertz, Comment, The Burden ofProofand Academic Freedom: Protectionfor
Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 505-06 (1988).

58. Id.
59. Rusoffv. Engel, 452 N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Div. 1982).
60. Ross v. Food Specialties, Inc., 160 N.E.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. 1959).
61. Zipparo v. Zipparo, 416 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 1979).
62. Mitchell v. Association of Bar of N.Y., 351 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 1976) (quoting In re
Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 289 (1953)).
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membership remains unsullied. Imposition of sanctions upon an attorney
serves not only as punishment to the disciplined attorney, but as a
deterrent to other attorneys. 63 By effectively policing its bar membership, a state ensures that other attorneys will be less likely to commit a
given offense. 64
More importantly, a state has a compelling interest in protecting the
public against an attorney who, quite simply, does not measure up to
professional standards. 65 An unfit lawyer can cause irreparable harm to
his clients through professional incompetence and should not be left free
to practice.' Further, by sanctioning the unfit attorney, the state ensures
that public confidence in the legal system is not diminished. 67 However,
notwithstanding the valid concerns harbored by the state, the significance
of an attorney's right to continue practicing law and the liberty
interest represented by this right necessitate change.
Indeed, the state has no greater impetus to protect society's interests
than in the context of grave criminal offenses.69 Yet such offenders are
afforded the highest burden in the country, that of beyond "reasonable
doubt."7 Two distinct functions are being served by this requirement.
First, it reduces the likelihood of erroneous convictions, and second, it
is symbolic of the great significance represented by criminal conviction.7 1 Hence, despite the severe nature of crimes such as murder,
mayhem, and the like, an alleged perpetrator may only be convicted upon
the most compelling evidence.
It is, of course, foolish to argue that disbarment proceedings share
an equal significance with criminal proceedings. An attorney may be
disciplined for non-criminal acts, or for conduct not involving fault, such
as mental infirmity.72 Nonetheless, the two proceedings are not entirely
dissimilar, and disbarment proceedings have been described as quasi-

63. Janine C. Ogando, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Needfor Public Protection,5 GEO. J.

LEGAL EThics 459, 462 (1991).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 461.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 461-62.
68. See supra part IV.A.

69.
70.
71.
72.

See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
See Underwood, supra note 18, at 1306.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Due Process in Lawyer DisciplinaryCases: From the Cradle to the

Grave, 42 S.C. L. REV. 925, 929 (1991).
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criminal in nature by no less an authority than the U.S. Supreme
Court.73 Underlying the Court's pronouncement were the justifications
that a disbarment proceeding is "designed to protect the public," is a
"penalty imposed on the lawyer," and that the privilege to practice law
is not one to be "lightly or capriciously" revoked.74 Thus, the "clear
and convincing" standard is uniquely suited for attorney disbarment
proceedings, where the allegations of wrongdoing are quasi-criminal in
nature, the interests at stake are more substantial than mere loss of
money, the defendant risks a tarnished reputation, and the individual's
right to his continued livelihood is jeopardized.
Further, New York has demanded at least the intermediate standard
in proceedings of far less significance than attorney disbarment, within
the context of revoking an individual's privilege. New York is required
to prove traffic infractions by no less than "clear and convincing"
evidence.7 5 Certainly, in a proceeding to revoke ones ability to practice
law, the individual's interests outweigh the states to a greater extent than
in a proceeding to suspend a driver's license. By the very balancing test
the New York courts have ascribed to, the logical conclusion is that the
higher standard should apply.
B.

DisbarmentProceedings in Other Jurisdictions

The majority of both state and federal jurisdictions require a
standard of proof higher than a fair preponderance of the evidence in
attorney misconduct proceedings.76 Prominently, California requires that
charges of unprofessional conduct by attorneys "should be sustained by
'7 7 New Jersey,78
convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty.
Illinois, 79 Florida,"0 and Connecticut8 ' all demand proof by "clear and

73. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (holding that the absence of any notice as to the
reach of a grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges alleged deprived an attorney
of procedural due process).
74. Elizabeth A. Fuerstman, Trying (Quasi) Criminal Cases in Civil Courts: The Need for
ConstitutionalSafeguardsin Civil RICO Litigation, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 169, 178 n.48
(1990).
75. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 227(1) (McKinney 1986); see also text accompanying note 29.
76.

JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 56.76 (1988).

Although the treatise's focus is on tax law, section § 56.76 contains an overview of the disciplinary
proceedings of attorneys in general.
77. Greenbaum v. State Bar, 544 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. 1976).
78. In re James, 548 A.2d 1125, 1128 (NJ. 1988).
79. In re Bossov, 328 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Il. 1975).
80. Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So.2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1970).
81. Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Presnick, 559 A.2d 227 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
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convincing" evidence, the last of which cites the Supreme Court's
decision in Addington as the underlying rationale for its application of
the standard. 2 Indeed, in at least one jurisdiction, a state court has
required that, in proceedings before the state disciplinary board, the
offense charged must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.8 3
In the Federal Circuits, similar reasoning has emerged. 4 Notably,
the Fifth Circuit has held that "[a] federal court may disbar an attorney
only upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
support the finding of one or more violations warranting this extreme
sanction."85 Further, in the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, the American Bar Association requires that formal charges
of misconduct be established by clear and convincing evidence.8 6 Yet,
in New York, an attorney's career can be ended based on a mere
preponderance of evidence.
C. Due Process and the Standard of Proof
Beyond the policy arguments supporting an increase in New York's
standard of proof lies the fundamental assertion that, in demanding a
mere preponderance of evidence, the state is denying the disbarred
attorney due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The dominant federal position has been that due
process requires "fundamental fairness" in all state proceedings." As
stated by Justice Harlan, the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the
concept of fundamental fairness "as part of our scheme of constitutionally ordered liberty."8 8 The criterion for determining whether an interest
deserves due process protection involves a simple assessment of its
importance to the individual.89

82. Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Rozbicki, No. CV-0436825, 1990 WL 270416, at *10
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 1990).

83. Cushway v. State Bar, 170 S.E.2d 732, 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
84. See, e.g., In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383,389 (5th Cir. 1988); Koden v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 235 (7th Cir. 1977); Collins See. Corp. v. Securities and Exch. Conm'n,
562 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360, 361 (E.D. Va.), affid, 381 F.2d
713 (4th Cir. 1967).
85. In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1992).
86. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 18(C) (1993).

87. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSrrr=TONAL LAW 413 (12th ed. 1991).
88. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372-73 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1971) (holding that a driver's license may not be
suspended without procedural due process). The test for determining exactly what process is due the
individual is explored infra in the text accompanying notes 93-98.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated that disbarment, a
punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer and quasi-criminal in
nature, accordingly entitles the attorney to procedural due process."° The
Fifth Circuit further pronounced that, because of the severe character of
the proceeding, a "court's disciplinary rules are to be read strictly,
resolving any ambiguity in favor of the person charged."'" Clearly, the
power of the courts to discipline attorneys necessitates the administration
of due process in the proceeding.92
Consequently, the inquiry focuses upon what process is due an
attorney under the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." 93 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of a given proceeding requires the consideration of three
factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the
likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the
procedure used, and the comparative effectiveness of an alternate
procedure; and (3) the interests counterpoised in the proceeding.94
Mathews v. Eldridge5 set out the framework under which due
process claims are currently assessed. 96 In essence, the balancing test
weighs the costs of requiring a particular set of procedures against the
benefits of the procedures. 97 The test has been criticized as being overly
subjective, allowing the court to override legislative pronouncements by
simply reevaluating questions of social utility.98 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's approach to due process, as stated in Mathews, has
remained the dominant one."
Yet this analysis mirrors the very balancing test New York has
avowedly applied in denying the "clear and convincing" standard in its
own disciplinary proceedings."° Thus, if the "fair preponderance of

90. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968); see also supra part IV.A.
91. In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1988).
92. Brewer, supra note 72, at 928.
93. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
94. Id. at 335.
95. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
96. See A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promisesand Due Process: An Economic Analysis
of the "New Property" 77 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1062 (1991).
97. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319.
98. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28, 48-49 (1976).
99. GuNTHER, supra note 87, at 599.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
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evidence" standard constitutes a denial of due process, New York courts
must necessarily be misapplying the test mandated on both the state and
federal level.
Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that just such an
erroneous refusal to apply the "clear and convincing" evidence standard
occurred in New York in Santosky v. Kramer, involving proceedings to
terminate parental rights over the parent's natural children.0 1 Prior to
the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition in Santosky, the New York
Supreme Court ruled that New York State could terminate, despite
parental objection, the rights of parents over their child upon a finding,
by a "fair preponderance of evidence," that the child had been "permanently neglected."'" 2 The Appellate Division upheld this standard, 3
and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the subsequent appeal."° The case ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which
held that the "fair preponderance" standard prescribed by the parental
severance law violated the Due Process Clause.'05
The U.S. Supreme Court described the permanent severance of such
parental rights as a "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child," which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.1°6 As such, it falls well within the Capoccia
requirement for the denial of personal or liberty rights, for which a "clear
and convincing" standard is required. 0 7 Nonetheless, just over one year
before the Capoccia requirements were outlined, New York refused to
raise its standard in parental rights termination proceedings.0 8 It was
only after Supreme Court intervention that the denial of due process
present in the Santosky case was recognized.
The Santosky decision is noteworthy in one other respect. In arriving
at its conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the fact that thirty-five
other states, and the District of Columbia, specified a higher standard of
proof than "fair preponderance of evidence" in their own parental rights

101. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
102. In re John AA, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Apel, 411
N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1980), vacated sub nom. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
103. Id.
104. In re Ape], 411 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1980), vacated sub nom. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745 (1982).
105. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.

106. Id. at 753.
107. In re Capoccia, 453 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1983).
108. In re John AA, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (App. Div.), appeal dismissedsub nom. In re Apel, 411
N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1980), cert. grantedsub noma.Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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proceedings."° The U.S. Supreme Court clearly felt, in deciding the
constitutionality of the New York standard, that the rulings of the other
states were relevant to deciding the New York case."'
The parallels between the Santosky decision and the issues presented
in attorney disciplinary proceedings are readily apparent. In both
contexts, the interest at stake is one of individual liberty rights, and the
remedy is severe. In both contexts, New York denied or denies proof of
the alleged conduct by a higher standard than a "fair preponderance of
evidence." In both contexts, a strong majority of other jurisdictions
required the higher "clear and convincing" standard of evidence or its
equivalent. Fundamentally, just as due process required New York to
raise the standard of proof in Santosky--the state's own ruling notwithstanding--so too should due process require that New York raise the
standard in its attorney disciplinary hearings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Friedman's assertion that the standard of proof should be higher
was not entertained by the New York Court of Appeals."' Further, it
is difficult to predict whether the higher standard would have altered the
outcome of the case in any significant way. Indeed, in Santosky, the case
was remanded without deciding the outcome under any standard." 2 The
Court was far more concerned with the broader ramifications represented
by the denial of due process imposed by New York law than the facts in
a particular case."' Friedman presents identical concerns.
Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the precise difference between
various standards of proof, adopting a particular standard is more than
"'an empty semantic exercise."' 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has called
it "'a crucial component of legal process, [whose] primary function ...is "to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions."'' ' In the
case of attorney disciplinary proceedings, it is crucial indeed, as the
attorney's reputation and livelihood hang in the balance.
109. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749.
110. See id. at 749-51.
I11. In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578, 586 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 635 N.E.2d 295
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994).
112. Santoslcy, 455 U.S. at 770.
113. See id.
114. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)).

115. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 n.9 (quoting Rehnquist J., dissenting, at 785 (quoting Greenholtz
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979))).
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The case of In re Friedman is particularly appropriate in this regard
insofar as the Special Referee originally recommended that Mr. Friedman
be suspended for a period of two years. 116 The Appellate Division, in
deeming the sanction too lenient," 7 was well within its authority."'
Yet, it is nonetheless disturbing that the court would impose such a
severe punishment despite the conclusions of its own officer.
It is ironic that the New York courts are denying rights to the very
individuals whose duties so closely affect the system of justice. Clearly,
the courts are concerned with the continued integrity of the justice
system, and are attempting to ensure that attorneys are acting with the
utmost propriety. Yet in so doing, they are sacrificing the attorney's
individual interests. Thus, in seeking to improve the legal process, the
New York courts are, in fact, thwarting it.
David M Appel

116. In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed,635 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994).
117. Id. at 587.
118. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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